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Abstract
Understanding social-ecological system (SES) feedbacks and interactions is crucial to improving societal resilience to
growing environmental challenges. Social-ecological systems are usually researched at one of two spatial scales:
local placed-based empirical studies or system-scale modelling, with limited efforts to date exploring the merits of
combining these two analytical approaches and scales. Here, we take a multiscale interdisciplinary approach to
elucidate the social dynamics underpinning cross-sectoral feedbacks and unintended consequences of decision-
making that can affect social-ecological system vulnerability unexpectedly. We combined empirical place-based
research with the Robustness Framework, a dynamic system level analysis platform, to analyse the characteristics
and robustness of a coastal SES in Cornwall, UK. Embedding place-based empirical analysis into a broader insti-
tutional framework revealed SES feedbacks and “maladaptations”. We find that decentralisation efforts coupled with
government austerity measures amplify second-order (reputational) risks. This prompted temporal policy trade-offs,
which increased individual and community vulnerability and reduced social-ecological system robustness, impeding
local adaptation to climate change. We identify opportunities to ameliorate these maladaptations by (1) implementing
coordination rules that can guide policymakers in instances of conflicting coastal management pressures, and (2)
recognising how second-order risks influence decision-making. This work demonstrates the strengths of combining
local and regional analyses to assess the robustness of social-ecological systems exposed to environmental changes,
such as climate change and sea level rise. Our results show how analysis of the multiscale effects of climate
policies, decision-making processes and second-order risks can usefully support local climate change adaptation
planning.
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Introduction
Global climate change is underway, and nowhere is this more
evident than in densely populated coastal areas (Moser et al.
2012). Population projections predict that the number of peo-
ple living in coastal regions will continue to rise throughout
the remainder of this century (Neumann et al. 2015) and risks
associated with flood exposure and subsidence will grow
(DeConto and Pollard 2016). From a policy and economic
perspective, rising sea levels will increase costs associated
with providing flood and storm alleviation (Hallegatte et al.
2013). At the same time, many national strategies emphasise
government decentralisation efforts and concomitant devolu-
tion of authority and responsibility from the national to the
local level, whilst simultaneously performing deep local bud-
get cuts (Ayres et al. 2013; Den Uyl and Russel 2018). This
often leads to policies and actions that emphasise short-term
social and economic benefits instead of decisions that support
long-term ecological and social resilience1 (Adger et al. 2011).
This includes investing in hard infrastructure, such as reinforc-
ing dikes and sea walls that protect economic activity and
assets in vulnerable coastal areas instead of pursuing long-
term solutions that limit the risks posed to society, for exam-
ple, relocating communities inland and strengthening the nat-
ural buffering capacity of the coast (Hino et al. 2017). These
shifts in coastal vulnerability, coupled with governance pres-
sures, add further complexity to contemporary governance
challenges in coastal areas.
Since few adaptation plans account for cross-scalar dynam-
ics and therefore overlook the multiscale and cascading effects
of these policies (Adger et al. 2005), there is increased likeli-
hood of perverse outcomes from climate change interventions
(Bunce et al. 2010). Although adaptation plans and policies to
address coastal climate change vulnerability have proliferated,
many policies fail to consider the interconnected processes
and feedbacks inherent in coupled social-ecological systems
(SES) and, instead, view climate change, vulnerability, and
adaptation planning in isolation. This has led to policy re-
sponses that fail to address underlying problems and may
exacerbate vulnerabilities (Hallegatte et al. 2015). As a result,
there are unexamined connections between policies at one
scale andmaladaptations and unintended consequences at oth-
er scales.
Risks of climate change include the physical and economic
impacts and the probability of harm, but also the perceived
dangers associated with these impacts and the uncertainty
surrounding them; what Dessai et al. (2004) distinguish as
external and internal risks, or what are commonly
understood as objective and subjective risks. Decisions on
how to manage risks associated with climate change and
adaptation are critically influenced by organisational
concerns. Renn (2010) refers to this as risk perception, where
physical risks can be attenuated or amplified by social pro-
cesses. Kuklicke and Demeritt (2016) suggest that risk has
ceased to be simply an object to be managed and has become
an organising principle in climate change adaptation. They
identify two distinct types of risk, or orders of risk in adapta-
tion management. First-order risks refer to both the physical
risks to society such as flooding or storm events, and the
explicit societal obligation or responsibility of an organisation
or individual to reduce uncertainty or harm—for example
building flood defences. Second-order risks refer to the risks
to the organisation relating to legitimacy and blame, namely
reputation management, that the individual and organisation
need to manage in order to maintain the successful continua-
tion of the organisation (Power et al. 2009). The general trend
for increased public accountability means that managers are
increasingly integrating second-order risk concerns into their
decision-making processes (Rothstein et al. 2006). This can
lead managers away from adaptive management when
second-order risks require particular responses or defensive
actions, for example focusing more on predictive statistics
rather than probabilistic approaches in order to manage inter-
actions with the public (Kuklicke and Demeritt 2016).
Adaptation decisions involve a range of socio-cognitive fac-
tors (Grothman and Patt 2005) and understanding how these
inf luence adapt ive management is important for
policymaking. The interaction between first- and second-
order risks is experienced at the individual scale but are emer-
gent in a system of interacting interests where decision-
making typically occurs. Combining place- and system-
based approaches is thus particularly useful to identify
second-order risks and, importantly, how they interact and
impact on decision-making.
In this paper, we apply a multi-scale, multi-method, inter-
disciplinary approach that combines empirical place-based re-
search with a dynamic systems perspective using the
Robustness Framework (Anderies et al. 2004; Anderies
2015). This analysis represents a novel attempt to systemati-
cally apply the Robustness Framework as a tool to embed
local, place-based analyses, i.e. the formal and informal hu-
man decision-making processes, within a formal context that
connects these processes to the hard and soft (e.g. rules, reg-
ulations) infrastructure and the natural system. Doing so re-
veals crucial interactions between first- and second-order risks
and how these interactions influenced maladaptive2 decision-
making in response to a series of intense storms but also
1 In this context, we define resilience as building fail-safe systems that have
the “capacity to sustain a shock and continue to function” which is similar to
the concept of robustness, except that resilience relies on learning, self-
organization and adaptation whereas robustness relies on backup sub-
systems and feedbacks (Anderies et al. 2013).
2 Maladaptation is where adaptation to climate change decisions may “fail to
meet their objectives, and they may even increase vulnerability” Barnett and
O’Neill (2010, 211).
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created spaces for potential proactive adaptation3 (Brown
et al. 2017b). We focus our analysis on the coastal county of
Cornwall, United Kingdom (hereafter, UK).
Our work builds upon and extends studies of disconnected
and disparate policy processes, such as coastal development
and environmental conservation, that have argued for the need
to integrate stakeholders at all governance levels in coastal
decision-making processes (Brown et al. 2001; Few et al.
2007). We use coastal systems as an exemplar in this paper,
but the principles developed here could be applied to other
resource-constrained systems, including communities affected
by other resource pressures (e.g. acute water shortages) and/or
environmental hazards, such as landslides, floods and
wildfire.
Why Cornwall?
Cornwall has many contextual factors that make it a good
example of many global tourist hotspots which are geograph-
ically isolated, economically disadvantaged, and have dis-
persed populations with substantive coastal climate change
risks. Cornwall is located on the southwestern tip of the UK,
where there are limited transport networks into and out of the
region—two highways and one railway line, and no ferry
transport connecting the region to the rest of the country.
Second, it is one of the most economically deprived, post-
industrial regions in the UK and one of the poorest regions
across Europe. Third, the community is dispersed and isolated
with strong localised prioritisation of place embedded within a
wider Cornish identity that unifies and distinguishes them
from other areas of the country. There is a mixture of long-
term and new residents, and Cornwall has the largest number
of second homeowners in England and Wales (Office for
National Statistics 2012). It has long been a tourist and retire-
ment destination, and the pressures and opportunities these
places on local resources continue to grow. This makes it a
good site to study the interaction of multiple stressors and
changes and their outcomes for adaptation and vulnerability.
These social and geographical pressures are amplified by
the rule structures operating in the UK, where there is a shift
from centralised financing for coastal flood and erosion risk
management to partnership funding models that require finan-
cial contributions from local regions (Begg et al. 2015). Local
regional budgets have also been reduced by the central gov-
ernment, leaving fewer resources for local governments at a
time when their burden of responsibility for coastal protection
is growing. These financial and governance pressures are po-
sitioned against a rule structure for coastal climate change
adaptation that is non-statutory. Shoreline Management
Plans (SMP) in England and Wales are used to assess current
and future risks for coastal communities due to erosion and
flooding over three time periods until 2100 (Ballinger and
Dodds 2017). They make recommendations on current and
future approaches to managing these risks, such as when and
where to “hold the line” of current defences, and when and
where to realign areas (such as moving roads and other infra-
structure in land). Whilst these policies are adopted locally,
they are non-statutory, so there is no requirement to follow the
recommendations they make.
Methodology
System-level analyses, such as the Robustness Framework
(Anderies et al. 2004; Anderies 2015) have been applied to
develop formal models of common pool resource systems
(Anderies 2006; Cifdaloz et al. 2010; Barnett and Anderies
2014) with limited studies applying these frameworks to local,
place-based issues in a resource governance context. In con-
trast, place-based analyses are typically undertaken in more
depth in a smaller geographic region, where interviews are
often carried out to gain perspectives on a particular issue
(Balvanera et al. 2017).
There are at least three formal conceptual frameworks com-
monly applied to study a SES: the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 2005,
2011), the Robustness (Anderies et al. 2004; Anderies 2015),
and the Social-Ecological Systems (SES) Frameworks
(Ostrom 2007, 2009). Both the Robustness and the SES
framework are extensions of the IAD framework and provide
complementary means to a systematic SES analysis. The
Robustness Framework is designed to allow the analyst to
explore feedbacks, flows, and nonlinearity in a SES which
helps provide a dynamic systems view that addresses the un-
certainty and connectedness of a complex coupled human-
natural system (Sterman 2002). It is also a means to uncover
hidden assumptions and biases by providing a common tool to
look at the Cornish SES from a social researcher’s perspective
and from the perspective of the systems analyst. The back and
forth interactions between researchers made our researchmore
robust and helped uncover hidden assumptions and biases that
directly influenced our findings. The influence of second-
order risks on governance processes emerged from interac-
tions between social researchers and analysts. The literature
review that the analyst conducted did not identify the second-
order risks, and the local interviews would not have necessar-
ily revealed the broader implications, embeddedness of the
second-order risks and their implication on other governance
processes that directly affect coastal adaptability to change.
We use the Robustness Framework for three reasons. First,
a shortcoming of the IAD and SES frameworks is that they
code key conditions within a SES at a given point in time
creating a static analysis. The Robustness Framework is
3 Proactive adaptation “denotes actions undertaken to reduce the risks and
capitalize on the opportunities associated with global climate change”
(Wamsler et al. 2014, 265).
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designed to address this by creating a conceptual platform
within which the dynamic interactions and feedbacks between
key components of the SES of interest can be analysed and
presented visually. Second, the Robustness Framework takes
the IAD concept of an action arena—a theoretical space in
which participants interact in an action situation, e.g. interna-
tional policymakers discuss global climate policy at a biennial
meeting—and expands it to four individual components: (1)
natural infrastructure (the resource system, R), (2) the resource
users (RU, i.e. local people who draw affordances from the
resource system), (3) the public infrastructure providers (PIPs,
e.g. civic agencies at various levels of government, hereafter
civic agencies), and (4) the hard (physical) and soft (rules,
regulations) human-made public and private infrastructure
(Anderies 2015, Fig. 1). In doing so, it illuminates the inter-
actions and feedbacks between the four elements, and the
exogenous drivers that exert pressure on the social and the
coupled natural/human-made hard and soft infrastructure
within the SES (Anderies et al. 2004; Anderies 2015).
Lastly, the Robustness Framework is designed to allow for
multi-scale governance analysis (e.g. Morrison et al. 2017).
It allows examination of the interactions and decision-making
that occurs at the operational governance level—where local
peoples’ daily decision-making directly affects the resource—
and the collective choice level where public infrastructure
providers create rules that govern the behaviour that takes
place at the operational choice level (Anderies et al. 2004;
Barnett and Anderies 2014). The Robustness Framework also
analyses two types of human subsystems: local people (i.e.
resource users (RU)) and civic agencies (i.e. Public
Infrastructure Providers, PIPs) allowing the interactions be-
tween these groups to be identified and related to the wider
pressures influencing decision-making. This can be coupled
with an assessment of the polycentricity of the system4 by
focusing on the composition within the PIP element and
how it is connected to PIPs at other scales by creating net-
works of adjacent action situations (McGinnis 2011; Therville
et al. this volume).
Our analysis focuses on a series of storms that caused wide-
spread disruption in Cornwall during 2013–2014.
One criticism of systems analyses is that they tend to rely
on secondary data. Our method extends the usefulness of the
Robustness Framework by examining place-based primary
data alongside secondary data derived from policy documents
and published sources.
An important criticism of the Robustness Framework, as
with any generalisation method, concerns the inherent trade-
offs in translating rich place-based data into more
Fig. 1 The Robustness Framework adapted from Anderies (2015) to
reflect the Cornwall context. The boxes represent natural infrastructure
(resource, R), hard and soft human made public infrastructure (PI), the
ovals represent the attributes of the local population and community
members (resource users, RU) and civic agencies (i.e. the public
infrastructure providers (PIP)). Arrows 1–6 represent the feedbacks be-
tween the four elements in the system, whilst arrows 7–8 represent exog-
enous drivers that affect infrastructure and human elements. Social and
private infrastructure (e.g. personal financial assets) can affect these
interactions
4 Polycentricity is a governance theory that has a multiplicity of definitions.
Here, we adopt Ostrom’s definition of polycentricity as a governance system
that consists of multiple governing authorities at differing governance scales in
which independent governance units are independent and exercise within a
specifically described domain of authority but remain interconnected with
each other (2005)
1838 L. A. Naylor et al.
generalisable findings. There is the risk that place-based find-
ings that point to larger phenomena may not be included in a
systems analysis or that local findings are viewed as
generalisable when they really are not (Ratajczyk et al.
2016). Meanwhile, place-based actor analyses can often miss
crucial temporal, spatial and governance interactions
(Balvanera et al. 2017). Our study involved iterative data ex-
change and cross check between researchers immersed in the
place-based data and researchers using a systems approach to
develop those findings into generalisable patterns. The two
approaches are complementary and allowed us to populate
the system-scale framework analysis with local data and situ-
ate the place-based actor analysis in the wider social-political
and institutional context.
The Robustness Framework was initially populated with
secondary data (e.g. from government reports) to gain an over-
view of the context and dynamics within the Cornish SES.
The preliminary results were shared online at Arizona State
University’s Social-Ecological Systems Library (SES Library
2016). In parallel with the preliminary robustness framework
analysis, primary data were generated over 18 months through
a workshop and three stages of interviews over 18 months
with managers in the environment sector (from civic agencies,
non-governmental organisations, civil society and the private
sector) involved in environmental issues (coastal manage-
ment, conservation, and climate change) at the Cornwall
county scale, to explore these individuals’ perceptions of
coastal management and adaptive capacity (Gallopin 2006)
to address global change. An initial round of interviews (n =
9) was conducted in 2014 following a series of storms in the
winter of 2013/2014 (first-order risk) where environmental
managers from civic bodies and NGOs with operational and
strategic roles in coastal flooding and risk management were
selected to explore individual and organisational responses to
the storms. The interview protocols were semi-structured, and
questions centred on how individual managers experienced
and handled coastal management decisions. The findings from
the first round of interviews shaped the research questions for
the second stage of data collection involving a creative partic-
ipatory workshop on risk management in Cornwall along with
a second (pre-workshop) and third (post-workshop) round of
interviews with PIPs. Interviewees from the initial round were
invited to the workshop, as well as additional managers in-
volved in sustainability management in Cornwall (Table 1
shows the range of organisations involved in the workshop
and second and third round of interviews).
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Purposive
sampling is appropriate for studies that require expert infor-
mation that cannot be obtained by randomly sampling the
population (Bernard 2011).
Central to our data collection was the creative participatory
workshop to the professional and personal negotiation of
risks. The workshop complemented the other data collection
methods and aimed to identify and characterise multiple and
complex risks in a creative and playful way. Participatory and
creative methods are increasingly advocated to enable wider
engagement in the subjective and emotional dimensions of
climate change risk and resilience (Brown et al. 2017a, b;
Heras and Tàbara 2014). Working in partnership with de-
signers specialising in creative participatory research tech-
niques, we developed a narrative workshop informed by so-
cial and cultural geography participatory research methodolo-
gies (Davies and Dwyer 2007). The workshop incorporated a
series of playful linked activities through which participants
were empowered to explore the interplay of first- and second-
order risks in decision-making scenarios, and the effect of
second-order risks on their decision-making practice and
wider risk management. Five activities used creative and par-
ticipatory techniques, including making physical representa-
tions of risk, generating and co-constructing future scenarios
of risks, and co-creating risk definitions. These activities in-
vited participants to move beyond organisationally normative
definitions of risk that typically focus on first-order risks such
as flooding. This was achieved by encouraging participants to
acknowledge their personal identities and experiences, and by
co-producing a definition of risk appropriate in both common-
place and professional risk contexts. The approach provoked
participants to make salient any personal or professional as-
sumptions that shape their first-order risk-related decision-
making. Discussions at each table were recorded and tran-
scribed and analysed alongside interview data.
For the pre- and post-workshop interview data, transcripts
were also coded using a set of coding variables developed
using Anderies’ (2015) revised Robustness Framework (Fig.
1) to test for interactions between individual elements in the
Cornish SES (see Supplementary Materials for a copy of the
coding manual). This coding framework was reviewed across
the research team to ensure context-specific validity. The data
clearly identify first- and second-order risks that influence
how coastal adaptation to climate change is managed. The
coded primary interview data were then integrated to enrich
and calibrate the Robustness Framework analysis. This pro-
vided additional insights into the nature of the interactions
within the SES, helping us better understand the effects of
second-order risks. Lastly, the Robustness Framework was
used to help interpret the effects of second-order risks on risk
management and adaptation practice in the Cornish SES,
using responses to severe storms as the case study.
Analysis
Our analysis focuses on understanding how first- and
second-order risks affect adaptive capacity within a SES.
The secondary data analysis of the Robustness
Framework (SES Library 2016) indicated that efficiency
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and cost-driven restructuring efforts by the UK govern-
ment in 2008 and 2011 transferred more coastal gover-
nance responsibility to the Environment Agency (EA) in
2008 and then in 2011 shifted again to a partnership
funding model. These changes in governance created
weaknesses in Robustness Framework Link 3 between
public infrastructure (PI) and those that provide the infra-
structure (i.e. Civic agencies, referred to as public infra-
structure providers (PIPs) in the Robustness Framework)
and Link 5 (Fig. 1). The secondary data review also indi-
cated that more recent local budget cuts, lack of coordi-
nation rules, and the non-statutory nature of coastal
change guidelines (the SMPs), were leading to temporal
po l i cy t rade -o ff s in which po l i cymake rs were
implementing short-term hard infrastructure fixes, instead
of long-term adaptation strategies.
Identifying second-order risks in the Cornish
social-ecological system
Analysis of the first round of interviews found that the
interaction between first- and second-order risks emerged
as a significant driver of adaptation management choices.
This helped to explain a core weakness in the Robustness
Framework interactions, which was then further investi-
gated. The second round of pre-workshop interviews thus
focused on issues related to second-order risks and insti-
tutional rules, providing data to populate the links be-
tween the PIPs (PIP in Fig. 1) and the other elements of
the Robustness Framework. From the first and second set
of interviews, it became clear that whilst the first-order
risks (e.g. managing roads, biodiversity, floods) that indi-
viduals managed across the sectors were distinct—the
second-order risks were largely similar across the sectors
interviewed. Six of the 15 workshop participants
highlighted this as the main learning for them, with one
participant stating that they were most surprised by how
much similarity and agreement there was amongst work-
shop participants from diverse organisations. In terms of
how risk was conceptualised, participants often highlight-
ed second-order risks as being as significant as statutory
obligations, as demonstrated in the following exchange
during the workshop:
Our issue with [specific role] is they’re [local authority]
very risk averse. All the time. Every time when they say
you can’t do that we say why not. Sometimes we’re not
managing the individual’s risk we’re managing the
council’s risk. It’s corporate risk, it’s a nightmare and it
kills everything we do.
(R14, Workshop transcript)
From these interviews, we were able to clearly identify a
series of second-order risks that were influencing the decision-
making of PIPs and allied groups (e.g. non-governmental or-
ganisations) (Table 2). These second-order risks exerted pres-
sure on decision-making where PIPs worked to contain and
manage the uncertainties they created. One participant in the
workshop described the most challenging issue as “How to
keep the main thing the main thing”. Pressure to respond to
public and central government demands or priorities (reputa-
tional risk) was discussed by participants as the main driver
for the technical and engineering response to the storm events.
They openly acknowledged that these actions did not align to
longer-term coastal change guidance such as the SMP. In this
situation, it is difficult to avoid being reactive and to negate the
impacts of second-order risks if adaptive planning guidance is
not statutory. We sought to explore how this influenced the
dynamics at the system scale and decision-making in response
to extreme storm events.
Impacts of second-order risks on system dynamics
Our place-based insights on second-order risks were used to
improve our understanding of the nature of the interactions in
the Robustness Framework which visualise the system dy-
namics in the Cornish SES. The interactions in the
Framework are numbered from 1 to 6 and colour-coded as
blue = positive or red = negative for internal SES processes;
and green = positive and orange = negative for external
drivers, where a black arrow indicates no interaction or driver)
between the four key aspects of systems frameworks: the
Table 1 Summary of participant
organisations and sectors in
interviews and the workshop
Sector Participant organisation Sector represented
Public Local government
National government agency
Environment
Environment
Civic Environment and culture non-profit organisation
Conservation area non-profit organisation
Environmental energy non-profit organisation
Economic non-profit organisation
Civil non-profit organisation
Environment and Culture
Environment
Environment
Social
Economy
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resource (R), local people (i.e. resource users (RU)), civic
agencies (i.e. public infrastructure providers (PIPs)) and pub-
lic infrastructure (PI) which can either be soft (e.g. policies,
rules, norms) or hard (engineered systems, such as dikes, le-
vees, roads)) forms of infrastructure. These interactions are
expressed in terms of their colour, as outlined above, direction
(of the interaction) and scale of impact (e.g. the size of the
arrow corresponds with the number of coded interview seg-
ments discussing this particular interaction in the SES—the
more text segments, the larger the arrow). Arrows 7 and 8
represent exogenous drivers or shocks that exert persistent or
rapid pressure on R and/or PI (link 7) or the PIP and/or RU
(link 8). Mapping the interactions described by interview par-
ticipants onto the Robustness framework allowed us to visu-
alise and animate the interactions as they flowed through the
SES. For example, civic agency staff concerns for second-
order risks (a link 2 interaction) generated a decision-making
context in which they were less likely to follow coastal change
guidelines when faced with re-development requests after se-
vere flooding events (a link 3 interaction).
Figure 2a and b depict the negative and positive interaction
(respectively) in the Cornish SES based on the number of
coded segments identified in the civic agency interviews. It
shows a general trend of negative interactions between differ-
ent aspects of the SES outweighing the positive ones, in all but
two instances (links 2 and 6). Links 1, 3 and 5 emerged as
particularly strong with the addition of interview data; for
example, the highest number of negative interactions was re-
ported for public infrastructure allocation via link 3 from the
public infrastructure providers to public infrastructure (11
Table 2 Summary of second-order risks identified from the place-based actor interviews
Second-order risk and
(Robustness Framework link)
Illustrative example from our interviews Response and implication
Reputation (link 6, RU to PI) Collapse of harbour wall following storms
Storm-induced collapse of road near coast—where
non-statutory coastal adaptation policy (the SMP) sug-
gests realigning the road to be further from the coast.
Public support for Mullion harbour to be rebuilt after the
storms meant inaction would undermine trust in the
organisation. In response harbour was built back
(against National Trust policy) in consultation with
public and a conversation that if it happened again that
wall would be left to natural forces.
Pressure from locals means that the road it is built back as
before rather than it being realigned future inland to
reduce long-term risk.
Funding cuts leads to changes
in funding structure (link 3)
Funding cuts to charitable organisations Changing funding structure puts a charitable organisation
in a difficult situation—it is a partnership of several
organisations—some of whom now regard them as
competitors. This impacts relationships and social capi-
tal.
Funding uncertainty (link 6) Funding uncertainty for civic organisation (renewable
energy network)
Organisation chose to align with larger public sector
organisation in order to gain legitimacy and capture
more funding. Organisation seeks collaborative
partnerships. Sometimes this results in organisations
having to change how they manage risk—e.g. they
become more risk averse—to align with public sector
standards.
Funding mismatch between
emergency funding and
existing plans and policy.
(link 3)
Funding mismatch around response to severe events Respondents in the public authorities demonstrated two
responses to this changeability.
Injections of money after events did not align with planned
spending and so often were spent quickly but in a
manner that diverged from long term adaptive planning.
Respondents with experience in injections of money after
severe events started to anticipate this change, and so the
authority of documents such as the SMP was
undermined.
Devolved responsibility (links
2 and 3)
Council and Environment agency (formal PIPs) devolve
responsibility of assets and flood risk management to
NGOs/civic organisations (informal PIPs) in response to
funding cuts.
Intensive time and investment are required in the handover
period to ensure partnerships between public and private
organisations function effectively, which are hard to find
during a period of severe job loss. In the long run, it
should reduce the exposure of some organisations to
certain place based risk and increase the adaptiveness of
small communities that are able to respond to risks in
context sensitive manners.
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coded text segments; 14.47% of negatively coded responses).
The addition of these data allowed us to better assess the
direction and scale of impacts, and thus determine where the
key stressors are in the Cornish SES. For example, exogenous
drivers (link 7 in Fig. 2a) such as climate change and flood
risks were clearly identified as major risk factors influencing
Cornish communities and decision-makers. Conversely, link 6
emerged as a positive interaction (Fig. 2b) where interviewed
policymakers identified public infrastructure production to re-
source users (7 coded text segments; 11.86%) as governance
strengths.
Resources provide affordances, such as freshwater, flood
alleviation, land for roads and buildings (link 1 R to RU).
These affordances are reduced and threatened by exogenous
drivers (link 7), like climate change, which exert pressure on
resources (R), (e.g. increased severe storm and flooding
events, coastal erosion and hard infrastructure (PI) (e.g. dam-
age to public buildings, roads). This leads to an increase in
vulnerability of public and private property, communities,
ecosystems, the economy (e.g. agricultural practice), as well
as damage and harm (link 1 R to RU and link 4 R to PI). Many
of the coded segments referenced a negative interaction be-
tween R and RU in link 1 (Fig 2a). Link 1 RU to R outlines the
economic asset allocation and coordination of materials that
are extracted from and/or the investment back into the re-
source. Here, one policymaker mentioned the effect of peo-
ple’s perceptions and use of resources (link 1, RU to R) and
funding availability (link 3, PIP to PI) were as significant as
Fig. 2 a, b Robustness
Framework layout and
abbreviations as in Fig. 1. This
figure identifies positive and
negative interactions within the
Cornish social-ecological system:
Solid red arrows indicate negative
interactions/feedbacks; dashed
yellow arrows indicate negative
exogenous drivers; solid blue ar-
rows indicate positive
interactions/feedbacks; dashed
green arrows indicate positive
exogenous drivers/connections
and black arrows indicate neutral
(neither positive no negative) in-
teractions. The thickness of the
arrows indicates the degree of
interaction—the thicker the ar-
row, the stronger the interaction—
and is based on the number of text
segments that identified a nega-
tive interaction in a particular link
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environmental constraints on the ability of communities to
adapt to changing environmental conditions (link 1, R to RU).
Interactions between civil society (i.e. resource users (RU))
and civic agencies (i.e. public infrastructure providers (PIP))
(Link 2) show the degree to which civil society is included or
considered in civic agency decision-making processes (PIP to
RU), as well as the degree to which civil society is able to
influence civic officials or agencies through lobbying and pe-
titioning efforts (RU to PIP). We found that this link usefully
highlights the transition of NGOs from organisations that rep-
resent citizens’ interests and are part of the civil society (i.e.
RU) to de facto civic agencies who are increasingly assuming
government responsibilities, due to decentralisation efforts
and budget cuts. This shift is emphasised in the concern about
(second order) reputational risks expressed by members of
civic organisations who report having to protect their reputa-
tion with high standards and a heightened concern about pub-
lic perception: “When dealing with the public, their perception
is the truth we have to deal with…” (R08, workshop).
Link 3 of the Robustness Framework outlines the interac-
tion between the civic agencies and public infrastructure (PI
hard, physical and soft, rules/norms) in which the civic agen-
cies engage in public infrastructure asset allocation/
coordination (interaction between the PIP and the PI) and
the hard/soft infrastructure facilitates information sharing
and flows to civic agencies (Anderies 2015). Based on the
interviews, this link represented the strongest interaction/feed-
back, both positive and negative, within the Framework.
Interviews with civic agency representatives suggest a nega-
tive feedback in link 3 in which civic agency employees stra-
tegically align with existing policy processes instead of being
more visionary and adapting policies to match that vision.
Second-order risks may be stifling innovation, vision and thus
the ability to meet coastal environmental challenges. Again,
there is evidence that the implementation of policies affecting
existing rules, regulations or procedures that reduce risk are
governed by second-order reputational risks:
…about assessing risk and a lot of what we do is
governed by ‘where does that fit within the policies that
allow us to do those things’ what is the risk attached to
that decision-making process. That’s the first thing
(R15, Pre-workshop interview).
The interactions between the resource and the hard and soft
public infrastructure in Link 4 contribute to economic produc-
tion (PI to R) in two ways: Either hard or soft rules serve to
protect a resource, e.g. creation and maintenance of a
protected area (investment in the infrastructure) or the hard
infrastructure is utilised to modify the resource for the benefit
of consumption, e.g. building an access road into an area for
tourism. One civic agency interviewee described the collapse
of the seawall at Coverack on south coast of Cornwall as an
example of a negative Link 4 feedback in which a lack of
proactive government intervention or investment into public
infrastructure, i.e. regular monitoring and maintenance of the
seawall [or managed retreat] led to catastrophic failure of the
seawall during a storm event (Link 4 R to PI hard) which, in
turn, left the village cut off and necessitated emergency (i.e.
re-build) interventions. Other link 4 (PI hard to R) weaknesses
included a lack of funding for long-term solutions to coastal
community risk resulting in “tweaks and mitigation” efforts
that made “incremental gains”, rather than long-term proactive
adaptive solutions.
Link 5 represents “governance production, i.e. monitoring,
sanctioning, conflict resolution, coordination… of resources
for economic production” (Anderies 2015, p. 271). In
Cornwall, non-statutory coastal governance (the SMP policy)
is in place that could potentially limit the development in areas
that are prone to flooding and rising seas. However, this guid-
ance is not always heeded, as exemplified in the storm exam-
ple below and Table 2.
Funding shortfalls create negative link 5 feedbacks in
which uncertainty of support from government agencies
brings a renewed focus on financial efficiency and a strong
economic framing around adaptation decisions. One work-
shop participant described the salience of the financial bottom
line:
I think the problem we’ve got now for those that are
involved in the sort of things we’re involved in is every
decision feels like it’s that way. So, you know, the triple
aim stuff, the experience, then the last one is the impact,
financial. Because of financial cut backs that now is the
first consideration. So, you know we’re looking at sav-
ing money. You know that’s where we’re starting
from…
(R15, Workshop transcript)
Some respondents describe a “relaxation of planning” and
regulation that is undercutting conservation actions taken over
the past three decades. Austerity measures (budget cuts) lead
to prioritisation of hard infrastructure improvements that
might increase short-term protection but can increase long-
term community and ecosystem vulnerability to climate
change.
The interaction between the public infrastructure
(hard/physical and soft rules or norms) and local people (i.e.
resource users, link 6 PI to RU) is characterised by the pro-
duction of public infrastructure for the benefit of local people.
In Cornwall, civic agency interviewees report that the link 6
feedback loop (PI to RU and RU to PI) is negatively affected
by a lack of investment and austerity driven cuts which have
led to the removal or downgrading of services and devolved
governance of public infrastructure across a range of sectors
(Link 6 PI to RU).
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Civil society (such as community groups) and non-
government organisations (NGOs) (as informal or de facto
PIP) are attempting to fill the social service gaps created by
financially inhibited formal PIPs (Table 1), expressed as a link
6 interaction. NGOs increasingly provide economic safety
nets by assuming the role of informal PIPs, where they apply
for funding and collaborate with formal PIPs to fill in the gaps
left by stretched government organisations in order to provide
flood risk infrastructure, clean energy and community support
services. For example, a formal PIP interviewed remarked
that,
20 years ago, we would have never thought that we
would give authority for flood gates to local communi-
ties. Now it is part of the general strategy. Collaboration
is becoming a reality. (R02, post-workshop interview)
In doing so, civil society organisations and NGOs assume
the de facto role of PIP but without the statutory obligation
that is attached to civic agencies. This has several implica-
tions. Whilst NGOs or civil society can act quickly, there is
no guarantee that they will be able to continue to provide
services as they are often wholly dependent on grant, donor
or voluntary contributions. Citizens may also not have legal
recourse if actions taken by NGOs or civil society organisa-
tions lead to negative outcomes.
The interaction in link 6 highlights an interesting develop-
ment resulting from the sustained funding cutbacks that finan-
cially struggling regions in the UK have been experiencing.
For NGOs, funding uncertainty causes respondents to stra-
tegically focus on alignment with bigger public organisations
to try to ensure security. For example, a manager from an
environmental charity described their strategy in an increas-
ingly uncertain political environment:
Yes, but an unsympathetic political climate, whether it’s
at the national or the regional or local makes it increas-
ingly challenging [funding]. And we have to be realistic
about that, but if we can join forces with others, again
then the chance of success becomes greater (R13, post-
workshop interview).
This alignment prompts shifts in second-order risks,
where NGOs choose to adhere to statutory guidelines and
public perception risk management strategies used by the
civic agencies. For example, reputational management in
terms of public perceptions of accountability become more
important and require increased attention and investment.
This represents a shift from formal civic agency responsibil-
ity to informal non-government bodies such as NGOs or
civil society organisations filling these roles. This negatively
influences the Robustness Framework (Fig. 2b), demonstrat-
ing the dynamic interplay between individuals and
institutions at different scales and the role of second-order
risks (Termeer et al. 2016).
Discussion
We applied our analysis of the SES system to examine local
scale responses to managing the effects of intense storms on
the local community. This allowed us to examine interactions
between different parts of the SES (nexus section), to identify
strategies to improve system robustness (strategies section)
and explore these through a scenario analysis (scenarios sec-
tion), discuss which governance changes in response to storms
may improve system robustness and lead to more proactive
adaptation decisions when recovering from storms.
The risk—decision-making nexus
By mapping coded interviews onto the Robustness frame-
work, we were able to visualise and animate the feedbacks
generated by a series of storm events over one winter. This
helped us gain a greater understanding of the underlying
drivers of decision-making and how interactions between var-
ious endogenous and exogenous elements combine to create
maladaptive decisions. We found that second-order risks be-
came especially significant and influenced decision-making in
relation to severe storms experienced in Cornwall in 2013–14
(Fig. 3a–c). Here, non-statutory policy was overruled by re-
building roads post-storm in their existing locations, which are
known to be vulnerable to coastal climate change. Why did
this happen? A series of dynamic interactions influenced
decision-making resulting in rebuilding, rather than a proac-
tive adaption decision in line with non-statutory coastal
change guidance (the SMP). This example provides further
evidence of the import of second-order risks known to influ-
ence flood risk decision-making in the UK (Kuklicke and
Demeritt 2016).
One of the civic agencies attending the workshop was
working with a local community that had recently suffered
from a severe flooding event that destroyed a main road
(Fig. 3, exogenous driver 7 on PI hard) requiring both emer-
gency and long-term repairs. The loss of the road (and asso-
ciated repairs) interfered with local people’s access to vital
services, such as food and healthcare, thus restricting contri-
bution to economic production and use (Fig. 3, link 4 hard PI
to R); this reduced the local population’s ability to access these
services (Fig. 3, link 1 R to RU).
The SMP recommended that the road be realigned inland in
the current planning timeframe (to 2025) due to its at-risk
location and the anticipated climate-change related risks such
as sea level rise and increased occurrence of extreme flooding
events (Fig. 3, link 3 PI soft to PIP). This requirement should
have guided civic decision-making towards a more adaptive
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approach that included considering realigning road access.
However, two forces were acting against this. The Prime
Minister responded to the storms with a clear message that
the government would actively support rebuilding of affected
communities and hard infrastructure assets (link 8, exogenous
political driver). Meanwhile, local people pressured the civic
agencies to rebuild the road, despite the coastal change rec-
ommendation (Fig. 3b, link 2 RU to PIP). A civic elected
official was interviewed and their connectedness to the local
community and desire to support their constituency’s views
(second-order risks) (Fig. 3b, link 2 PIP to RU), led them to
ignore the non-statutory coastal change guidelines recommen-
dation (Fig. 3c, link 3 PIP to PI). This, along with second-
order risks led civic agency staff and civic elected officials
to allow the road to be rebuilt “one more time” (Fig. 3c,
link 4 PI hard to R). However, the contribution to econom-
ic production and private consumption that rebuilding the
road represents comes at a cost. By overruling the coastal
change guidelines (i.e. soft public infrastructure), the
decision-maker undermined their capacity to effectively
mitigate the interaction in link 1 between the resource
and local people in the future (Fig. 3c, link 5 soft PI to link
1). This decision not only represents an inefficient use of
funds (Fig. 3c, link 3 PIP to PI—public infrastructure
asset allocation), but it also has the potential to perpetuate
a cycle of risk (see Figs. 3a–c) where the next severe
flooding event may expose the community to repeated in-
terruptions of vital services, instead of mitigating such
risks in a more resilient manner.
This example also illustrates how the Prime Minister’s re-
sponse to rebuild after the storms undermines the ability of
local civic agencies to make the decisions most appropriate for
the specific locality. For example, recent correspondence be-
tween the research team and the minister for floods confirms
that decision making after storm events is the responsibility of
local civic agencies:
Any special funds for recovery following severe events
are coordinated by the Department for Communities and
Local Government. Decisions about the focus and na-
ture of any recovery funding will be made in light of the
circumstances following an event. Government depart-
ments will set objectives for how any funding theymake
available is used by local authorities. How spending on
flood risk and coastal erosion management is prioritised
is a matter for the [local] risk management authorities.
They are best placed to identify local priorities. (Coffey
pers. comm. 2017).
We posit that it would be difficult for local civic officials or
civic agency staff to contradict the Prime Minister’s “rebuild”
Fig. 3 a- d Robustness Framework layout and abbreviations as in Fig. 1.
In this figure, the risk-decision-making nexus of one response to the
2013–14 floods was mapped where 3a–c provides a step-by-step illustra-
tion of the how the decisions taken post-storm increased second-order
risks and led to re-building a road in an area identified for realignment
and 3d illustrates how changes in exogenous drivers may have reduced
second-order risks and led to a more proactive adaptation response post-
storm. Links are detailed in the main text
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in favour of a decision with more reputational risk—to oppose
the Prime Minister and follow non-statutory government
guidelines instead. Whilst the example in Fig. 3c only repre-
sents one example of a civic official and civic agency response
to storms, many local decision-makers elsewhere in the UK
and further afield will likely face similar challenges in re-
sponse to future storms.
Strategies to ameliorate second-order risks to allow
more resilient decisions in response to storm events
Our results demonstrate how second-order risks have a
strong influence on decision-making in response to storm
events. Decisions were taken to manage second-order
risks such as reputational risks instead of using storm
events as catalysts for proactive adaptation to climate
change. This finding prompts many questions about how
to better acknowledge, account for, and manage second-
order risks when dealing with the immediate effects of
first-order risks (i.e. storm damage) on society. These in-
clude the following:
1. What local governance systems (i.e. coordination rules)
and funding mechanisms may best support identifying
and managing second-order risks?
2. How do second-order risks propagate across scales of
governance? For example, what national scale political
factors and government policies amplify second-order
risks for local civic agencies and how might these be
ameliorated?
For example, may an increase in funding and/or fur-
ther decentralisation of funding and local empowerment
enhance or reduce capacity of civic agencies, NGOs,
civil society and local people improve resilience to
coastal issues such as increasing risk and impact of
storms and floods? Or would risk registers assist in
identification and mapping of second-order risks (e.g.
Demeritt and Nobert 2011), so that they are more ex-
plicitly part of risk management decision-making? In
this paper, we evaluate one of these questions, question
2, to explore how changes in governance may improve
SES robustness.
Scenarios to evaluate the effects of governance
changes on social-ecological system robustness
By incorporating coded primary data into the Robustness
Framework, we can identify weaknesses in governance
processes where exogenous drivers (e.g. central govern-
ment undermining long-term policy in favour of fixing
things in the here and now) and second-order risks
destabilise decision-making. We tested question 2 by
changing inputs to the Robustness Framework to see if
changes to national political and policy frames could af-
fect local-scale second-order risks. The coastal road re-
building example described above identifies two places
in the Robustness Framework (link 8 and link 3,
Fig. 3c) where post-storm decisions appeared to amplify
second-order risks faced by local civic agencies (Renn
2010). We adjusted those two factors whereby: (1) the
Prime Minister and central government respond to storm
event recovery in line with their coastal change guide-
lines, instead of publicly supporting rebuilding post-
event in places of known high erosion and flood risk (link
8 on PIP) (2) making the existing non-statutory coastal
change guidelines statutory (i.e. a change to the condi-
tions of the soft PI) would help reduce reputational
risk—one of the key second-order risks identified.
Figure 3d shows how adjusting these two Framework
inputs (central government stance and statutory policy le-
vers) may reduce second-order risks locally by strength-
ening links between the civic agencies and local people
and reducing reputational pressure. This would provide
stronger political and policy positions upon which civic
agencies and civic officials can make more proactive ad-
aptation decisions after storm events (such as not rebuild-
ing the road in the same, at risk, location). These strength-
ened links indicate reduced pressure from second-order
risks on local civic agencies (Fig. 3d, link 2) compared
with the links based on our empirical data discussed
above (Fig. 3c). These changes, alongside other measures
to acknowledge and manage second-order risks such as
risk registers (Demeritt and Nobert 2011) may empower
them to make space for more proactive adaptation in re-
sponse to storm damage (Brown et al. 2017b), improving
the long-term resilience of the Cornish SES. One example
of fostering proactive adaptation might be to make SMPs
mandatory so that in effect, they shield decision-makers
from second-order risks.
Policy recommendations
The CCC (2018, chapter 3) report cites complex governance
arrangements as a key impediment to effective management of
coastal erosion and flood risks. Our research confirms this and
shows how multiple stakeholders and actors, with differing
and often conflicting policy goals affect our ability to adapt
to coastal climate change. Identifying areas where different
governance levels and areas can align (as Fig. 3c–d illustrate)
will help reduce these conflicts, would improve our ability to
manage coastal risks.
The analysis also demonstrates that second-order risks (i.e.
individual reputational risks) are often prioritised over first-
order risks (i.e. storm risk to communities) in adaptation de-
cision-making. To address this, sustained engagement with
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diverse stakeholders is necessary to identify, and deliberate,
second-order risks. This, we argue, will help “facilitate change
in social attitudes” that are needed to deliver “sustainable
coastal adaptation” (CCC 2018, p.9).
Finally, the findings underscore the need for a shift
to proactive rather than reactive responses to extreme
events. Adaptation planning requires that strategies are
agreed in advance of extreme events such as intense
storms or floods, rather than worked out in response.
Storms and floods might then represent event-based
thresholds or triggers for implementing adaptation plans.
This approach would allow shoreline planning policies
(designed to identify and alleviate first-order risks) to be
implemented instead of rebuilding of at-risk assets. Our
research shows why it is important to shift to event-
based decision-making (CCC 2018), so that storm
events become windows of opportunity (Brown et al.
2017a, b) for proactive adaptation. Reforms to policy
are needed to deliver this.
Conclusions and perspectives
Through this analysis of the Cornish SES, we have dem-
onstrated how the integrated and iterative analysis of
place-based empirical data within the Robustness
Framework can help identify key feedbacks and interac-
tions with second-order risks. The multiscale, mixed
methods approach used here shows how the Robustness
Framework can be used dynamically to identify the cas-
cading effects of second-order risks and decisions on SES
resilience. It exposes how second-order and first-order
risks interact, providing three novel insights for coastal
climate change adaptation. First, collaboration between
different agencies–including civic agencies, NGOs and
civil society–as a risk-spreading strategy to manage com-
plex multi-sectoral problems, may exacerbate and amplify
some second-order risks. Second, we identified how
second-order risks emerge, interact, and propagate across
governance scales. Third, our data demonstrates that
second-order risks strongly influence decision-making
and in doing so, increase maladaptive responses to coastal
climate change risks.
This type of analysis can be applied to better identify how
first-order risks interact with the second-order social, political
and governance risks act to produce maladaptation.
Policymakers can use this approach to adapt and strengthen
multi-scale governance systems to aid delivery of proactive
adaptation to climate change.
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